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More seriously but not Copp's 
fault there is a major problem with 
the transcription of French names. 
Major Leon Brosseau, D Company 
commander, killed in action, is 
referred to as Lucien. Killed in the 
same action is the mortar platoon 
commander, Captain Orieux, 
referred to in the book as Oriens. A 
friend of this reviewer, Major Alex 
Angers, shot through the throat, is 
referred to as Alexander not as 
Alexandre, which is his real name. 
These may seem small errors.but 
in work such as this, precision is 
most desirable if only out of respect. 
In a three-line quote requiring 
simple transcription (p.lll) there 
are five mistakes. An alert and 
qualified proof reader could have 
spotted these errors. 
Copp's conclusion that the 
Canadians proved the equals, 
indeed, the betters oftheir enemies 
is contrary to the impressions 
created by Canada's dean of 
military history, C.P. Stacey. The 
tendency in Stacey's time was to 
perpetuate the Canadian 
propensity to self-denigration: 
something which Copp and others 
are no longer willing to accept. The 
performance ofthe officers and men 
of 5 CIB bears witness to their 
forbearance in the face of the 
staggering odds stacked against 
them emanating paradoxically at 
times from the pettiness and 
incompetence of some of their own 
superiors. Had they been trained 
in the best way to meet the realities 
of the battlefield? At a very heavy 
cost, they bested those who had for 
too long been considered the best. 
The leadership, Copp correctly 
concludes, had been much too slow 
in realizing the absolute need for 
adequate force-ratios to overcome 
well-equipped and desperate 
defensive forces. 
Gil Drolet is a retired Professor of 
War Literature at Le College 
militaire royal de Saint-Jean. He 
has a special interest in the French 
Canadian infantry regiments of the 
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Among the vast number ofbooks recently published about the 
Second World War, a large number 
are biographies of Churchill or 
analyses of his place in that strug-
gle, a reasonable enough endeavour 
in that not even his harshest critics 
can deny his importance in World 
War Two. 
The immediate reaction to the 
selection of books on Churchill 
reviewed below is that, with one 
exception, they add little to the 
vast body of material which already 
exists on the subject of Churchill 
and the war in general. 
Churchill was a prolific writer 
and he has left behind a huge body 
of written material. Moreover he 
rushed to publish his memoirs 
immediately after the Second 
World War as well as after the 
First (of which Lord Balfour so aptly 
said; "I hear that he has written a 
big book about himself and called it 
'The World Crisis."'). Apparently 
everyone whoever talked to him or 
saw him in the distance has left 
behind some clever entry in his 
diary or memoirs. Consequently 
there exists an absolute treasure 
trove of material from which to 
mine endless quotations by which 
one can prove a variety of likely 
and not so likely interpretations of 
his actions. 
"Not only did Mr. Churchill 
both get his war and run it: he also 
got in the first account of it."1 It 
was an account, moreover, that was 
not only massive and well-written, 
but one that was also replete with 
documentation. That meant that 
Churchill had not only "run" the 
Second World War but that he had 
also set the agenda for those, at 
least those concerned with British 
History, who began the process of 
writing about it. But after fifty 
years and the opening of most of 
the archives, this advantage has 
begun to wear off. Now Churchill 
can be criticized not only for what 
he did but also for what he said he 
had done. No doubt that is a 
problem for all those who are 
tempted to write their memoirs, 
which nowadays seems to be a 
substantial portion of the 
population, but a book about 
Churchill, his actions and memoirs 
can still create enough interest to 
get the author close to the best-
seller list. 
That Churchill had enormous 
influence on the direction of the 
British war effort has not yet been 
called into question, at least not in 
the four books reviewed below. He 
was aware that "running" a war 
was not an easy matter, as he had 
personally experienced in World 
War One during his somewhat 
disastrous stint as First Lord of 
the Admiralty. He was also aware 
that strategy and war-making only 
look easy "That is why critics can 
write so cogently, and yet successful 
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performers are so rare."2 The same 
comment might well be made about 
writers, particularly perhaps, 
writers and historians whose 
subject is Winston Churchill and 
his wars. These fall into a number 
of categories: 1) Those who are 
concerned with trying to deal 
seriously with some issues of his 
career which might need some 
further exploration; 2) Those who 
have some special case to make 
about a particular but naturally 
crucial aspect of his work; 3) Those 
who seem to write simply because 
so many others have and 4) Those 
who have some contemporary 
political axe to grind and want to 
use him for that purpose. 
Churchill: A Major 
Reassessment of his Life in Peace 
and War, edited by Robert Blake 
and Roger Louis is the result of a 
conference held at the University 
of Texas in March 1991 and clearly 
falls into the first category. It was 
a gathering of some of the most 
distinguished historians of the 
period and the book reflects the 
expertise which they brought to 
the conference. There are twenty-
nine different essays, each dealing 
with a particular aspect of 
Churchill's life and career. The 
essays are naturally rather uneven 
in quality- Craig manages to write 
about Churchill's view of Germany 
without dealing with 
"unconditional surrender" or 
"strategic bombing" in a rather 
innocuous essay on an important 
subject; Johnson similarly has very 
little new to say about Churchill's 
relationship with France; Pelling, 
dealing with Churchill and the 
Labour Party, leaves out what is 
surely one of the most important 
elements of that relationship, 
namelythatofChurchill andAttlee 
during the War itself;3 Michael 
Howard contributes a somewhat 
disappointing essay on Churchill 
and the First World War which is 
rather bland for that usually 
brilliant historian but nevertheless 
covers all the main points. There 
are a good many other contributions 
which seem to add little to what is 
already well known, although they 
contain very few instances where 
one can seriously quarrel with the 
authors. Perhaps R.V. Jones's, 
"Churchill and Science," should be 
singled out as an essay which does 
not even live up to its title- it is 
really an essay about the 
relationship between Churchill and 
Lindemann and not a very useful 
one at that. It does not deal with 
the really important issues- such 
as "Operational Research"- which 
is surely as important an aspect of 
Churchill's use of science as 
Lindemann's ability to calculate 
the amount of champagne 
Churchill had drunk - an 
extremely well-worn story. 
On the other hand, Addison 
provides a very useful and effective 
summary ofhis latest book,4 which 
should provide much food for 
thought for those who see Churchill 
only as a somewhat flamboyant 
warrior. D.C. Watt's essay on 
Appeasement is critical but fair, as 
is Hinsley's on Intelligence. Blake 
provides a meticulous and detailed 
account of Churchill's succession 
to Chamberlain in May 1940, which 
is an important balance to the often 
held view that his succession was 
both popular and inevitable. 
Keegan has perhaps the most 
difficult task because of the vast 
literature in the field of 
Churchillian strategy. He offers a 
reasonable account of an often 
highly emotional and controversial 
subject, which includes everything 
from strategic bombing, the 
"Second Front," and the 
Mediterranean strategy to the 
Balkans and Churchill's relations 
with Stalin. 
This is not a book which can 
easily be read in a single sitting 
but it will surely become a serious 
reference work. Its footnotes 
provide the reader with a fair cross-
section of current research into 
many aspects of the first half of the 
twentieth century and it expresses, 
often elegantly and succinctly, the 
ideas of historians who have made 
distinguished contributions in their 
fields. Individually some of the 
essays are often highly critical of 
Churchill but collectively, as the 
editors point out in their 
introduction: 
The book pays tribute to his 
stature, though sometimes the 
investigation is critical and the 
judgements are unflattering. The 
critical line of approach must not 
be misinterpreted as an attempt 
to diminish Churchill's reputation. 
On the contrary, when subjected 
to scrutiny in the light ofhistorical 
evidence, Churchill emerges with 
both his integrity and his 
greatness intact. [p.8] 
It remains to be said that it is 
a pity that neither Martin Gilbert, 
the author of the massive 
"authorized" biography nor any of 
the now fairly numerous detractors 
were present at the conference. 
Tuvia Ben-Moshe's book 
Churchill: Strategy and History 
belongs in many respects to the 
second category. The author 
promises not only to clarify 
Churchill's strategy in both World 
Wars but also to show how 
Churchill's versions of what 
happened are at great variance 
with what he actually did. This is 
129 
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a formidable task and Ben-Moshe 
claims that he only reluctantly 
came to it after he had devoted 
"years to the study of military 
history and strategy." [p.4] The 
first chapter traces Churchill's 
changing views, particularly on the 
question of the "continental 
commitment" from 1900-1914. Its 
conclusion is rather unexceptional, 
as is Ben-Moshe's narrative over 
the question ofBritain's declaration 
of war in 1914. The question of the 
Dardanelles campaign is obviously 
the centrepiece of the discussion 
about the first war. The failure of 
that enterprise and Churchill's part 
in it are well established, 5 and Ben-
Moshe's attempt to place this 
failure into a much wider context 
of grand strategy and historical 
understanding are somewhat 
unconvincing. "Churchill wanted 
to have the best of all worlds: he 
wished to avoid the extremely costly 
direct offensives: but at the same 
time he called for a strategy of 
attrition (which involved killing as 
many Germans as possible) and for 
the sort of grand maneuver that 
has not been possible since 1916." 
[p. 79] The author then rightly 
points out that such strategy was 
impossible in that war and that the 
only alternative was a compromise 
peace. This is no doubt correct but 
it did not happen. Concluding this 
section, the author states that "the 
broad tenor of the spirit conveyed 
in Churchill's "World Crisis"is that, 
had his strategic plans been fully 
accepted and properly carried out, 
the war would have been shorter 
and less costly to the Allies." [p.81] 
Of course Churchill is entitled to a 
hypothetical and egocentric opinion 
but such an opinion is surely no 
more amenable to proof than the 
author's view that " ... had the 
strategy that Churchill advocated 
after the end of 1915 indeed been 
fully implemented, then Germany 
would not have been defeated in 
1918." [p.81] Unfortunately the 
idea that one can readily tell the 
outcome of what did not happen 
lies at the heart of Ben-Moshe's 
critique of Churchill's strategy. 
130 
Churchill in opposition is more 
to Ben-Moshe's liking. He thinks 
that although Churchill's 
"assessments were now partly 
mistaken and characterized by 
conservatism" they nevertheless 
were more correct "when compared 
with predictions of most military 
men in Britain and France ... " 
[p.120] Again Ben-Moshe is 
convinced that he can tell what 
was likely to happen if, in this case, 
Churchill's policy had been 
adopted. Churchill's stay at the 
Admiralty receives little attention 
in this book. In matters which 
seem marginal to the author, the 
Norwegian campaign for instance, 
he simply claims that this fiasco 
was just a repetition of the Gallipoli 
campaign [he again leaves out the 
French dimension] and suggests 
that in this case "the strategic 
consequences were not far 
reaching." [pp.123-4] Indeed much 
of the summer of 1940, including 
the Battle of France, the Battle of 
Britain and the Battle of the 
Atlantic hardly receive any 
mention at all. It is naturally the 
decision to defend the 
Mediterranean strategy and the 
consequences of this action with 
respect to the U.S. Alliance and 
the second front which are the 
centrepiece of the book. 
In this Ben-Moshejoins a long 
line of authors who have very 
definite views on this question.6 
He describes carefully and 
reasonably the usual catalogue of 
errors made during 1941, 
particularly the halt of the British 
armies in North Africa and the 
decision to intervene in Greece. 
However it is important to note 
that these decisions were made 
within the context of the 
Mediterranean strategy, not 
alternatives to it. Surely the whole 
question of Churchill's decision to 
defend the Eastern Mediterranean 
in the fall of 1940 was based on the 
premise that German strategy was 
bound to give first priority to the 
defeat of Britain. Churchill can be 
accused of foolhardiness because 
he did not know, when he made his 
major decisions, that Hitler 
regarded the Mediterranean by the 
spring of1941 as a distraction from 
his more important concerns. This 
is not a point, however, which the 
author emphasises. Rather he 
takes issue with Michael Howard's 
view that the "real" Mediterranean 
strategy should be dated from the 
fall of 1942 and that what went 
before were simply the piecemeal 
responses to the difficulties of the 
summer of 1940. [p.166] It is not 
unreasonable to argue that 
obviously the British had 
committed themselves to a serious 
campaign in the Mediterranean 
before either the Russians or the 
Americans were attacked, but it is 
not so easy to dismiss the essence 
of Howard's argument that the 
commitment to the North-African 
campaign [Operation "Torch"] 
represented the point at which the 
Mediterranean strategy becomes a 
matter for serious debate, both from 
the point of view of Anglo-U.S. 
relations and in terms of the timing 
of the invasion of North-West 
France. 
Ben-Moshe tries to prove that 
in fact Churchill did not change in 
his strategy after Pearl Harbour, 
and that indeed his strategy had 
neither an imperial nor a clear 
political aim in 1943. Certainly 
the existing documentation does 
bear out the idea that in the period 
1940-3, Churchill's overwhelming 
pre-occupation was the winning of 
the war, rather than preserving 
the Empire. That seems to be the 
main thrust of Ben-Moshe's 
accusation, that Churchill really 
had no strategy at all, in the sense 
that strategy ought to have a clear 
political aim. Although why so 
many authors seem to think that 
winning the war against the Axis 
Powers was not a political aim 
remains mysterious. However the 
lack of political aim is certainly the 
main thrust of the conclusion of 
Chapter 8. 
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Churchill at the controls of the Boeing Flying Boat which carried him across the Atlantic on 14 January 1942. 
Unlike others who have 
accused Churchill of deliberately 
delaying the opening of the second 
front for political reasons, Ben-
Moshe takes a rather different line. 
He does not think that an invasion 
of France could have succeeded in 
1943, adding "By its nature, that 
hypothesis is not amenable to 
decisive proof." [p.27 4] But he does 
not follow his own advice about 
hypotheses, because he now argues 
that had the issue been left to 
Churchill alone, there would not 
have been an invasion in 1944 
either. But surely that again rests 
on an even more remote hypothesis 
-which is that in 1944, there was 
no Russian Front and no U.S. Army 
in Europe. It is also based on a 
rather special reading of certain 
documents, most particularly the 
meeting of 19 October 1943. But 
surely that meeting, like so many 
others, has to be put into context. 
Churchill may have had 
exaggerated fears of the power of 
the German Army, but the author 
does not help his case by failing to 
recognize the actual course of the 
battle in Russia, on which, after 
all, so many calculations with 
respect to the "second front" were 
based. For instance his claim that 
the German Armies had effectively 
been defeated by the end of 1943 
comes as something of a surprise. 
"By the end of 1943 it [the Soviet 
Union] had effectively defeated the 
German Army; its forces had 
reached lines approximating 
Russia's old borders before the 
outbreak ofWorld War II." [p.284] 
It is true that Vatutin's First 
Ukrainian Army Group had 
crossed the 1939 Polish border in 
the centre of the Pripet marshes 
and taken Sarny by January 12th, 
but on that same date Leningrad 
was still under siege, Army Group 
Centre was less than 7 5 miles from 
Smolensk, the Crimea was still 
occupied, Oddessa was still in 
German hands, in fact the line 
north ofPri pet marshes would not 
change drastically until June 1944; 
although the siege of Leningrad 
was lifted and the Estonian border 
reached by 2 March 1944. Clearly 
the German Army's offensive power 
had been effectively contained, but 
the notion that it had been fully 
defeated is simply untrue. 
It is into this general context, 
[Kiev was not recaptured by the 
Russians until 6 November 1943] 
plus the growing apprehension of 
the new German weapons that the 
meeting of 19 October needs to be 
placed. The argument that this 
meeting, as well as some others, 
were clear indications that 
Churchill wanted to avoid 
"Overlord" altogether are really far 
from obvious. 7 But again the major 
difficulty is that in fact the invasion 
did take place and therefore 
Churchill's intentions during the 
second half of 1943, had he been 
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In Ben-Moshe's last chapter, 
which deals with the post-invasion 
strategy, Churchill is again accused 
of misunderstanding the 
relationship between military 
strategy and political aims which 
now naturally revolve around the 
Russian question. Ben-Moshe 
quotes Liddell Hart tentatively to 
suggest that a great opportunity 
had been missed in September to 
bring the war to an end in 1944. He 
also enlists Martin van Creveld to 
suggest that Montgomery's 
strategy, the proper way to win in 
1944, might at least have brought 
the Allies to the Ruhr, although 
van Creveld concludes his 
discussion of this whole subject 
with "In the final account the 
question as to whether 
Montgomery's plan presented a real 
alternative to Eisenhower's 
strategy must be answered in the 
negative."8 
In his concluding chapter Ben-
Moshe argues that by the time the 
invasion took place, the Germans 
had already been defeated and that 
the only real purpose for the 
invasion was to shorten the war 
and to find a reasonable political 
settlement with the Soviet Union. 
[p.320] That no doubt will come as 
a surprise to the millions of Allied 
and Axis soldiers who had to fight 
their way through those last bitter 
months of the war. Given that he 
has argued previously that the 
invasion was not really possible in 
1943, it is difficult to understand 
what the real alternatives were or 
why he considers that the Germany 
was already beaten in 1943, except, 
of course, in hindsight. 
Despite the meticulous 
scholarship and the carefully 
nuanced paragraphs, it is difficult 
to find this book convincing; 
nevertheless its criticisms of 
Churchill's strategy are often 
thought-provoking and will 
certainly find their place with the 
others who have attempted to be 
better strategists than Churchill, 
132 
at least in their books. Nor, given 
some of the questions raised above, 
can one readily agree that 
Churchill's "Second World War," 
whatever its faults, "is a false 
version of events." [p.333] 
Richard Lamb's book Churchill 
as War Leader: Right or Wrong? 
offers a quite different fare from 
the two books reviewed above. It 
really falls into the third category. 
Lamb claims that this book was 
especially designed to introduce the 
subject to "University and sixth 
form students" and that he is an 
admirer of Churchill. In fact he 
concludes that, "Alone Winston 
Churchill saved Western 
civilization from destruction at the 
hands of the Nazis." [p.339] The 
difficulty is that there is very little 
in this book that would convince 
anyone that this was so and it is, 
moreover, often expressed in a 
rather simplistic fashion. 
Surely Lamb is wrong to think 
that students should be fed a fare 
of utter simplicity, such as his first 
chapter on appeasement. "Post-
war evidence entirely vindicates 
Churchill's claim that the military 
situation in 1938 was such that it 
was folly to capitulate to Hitler at 
Munich." [p.12] is one of many 
declaratory sentences which turn 
this first chapter into something 
less than a reasonable historical 
exercise. 
Lamb takes us through the fall 
of France and the summer of 1940 
without mentioning either the 
Battle of Britain or the air attacks 
on Britain during the winter of 
1940-1. In Chapter 8 we are told 
that "Churchill had secret 
intelligence that the risk of invasion 
was diminishing," [p.83] so he sent 
tanks to the Middle East. It is a 
pity that Hinsley did not know this 
when he wrote his careful study of 
the British Intelligence on the 
German invasion plans [see 
particularly Hinsley, British 
Intelligence, Volume I Chapter 5]. 
In the chapter in which Lamb 
considers the question of the Far 
East, he argues that Churchill was 
anxious for a war between Japan 
and the U.S.A., as that would draw 
the Americans into a war with 
Germany. The problem is that 
none of the evidence which Lamb 
presents supports this argument. 
Unfortunately much of the rest 
of the book follows this pattern. 
Unquestionably the surrender of 
Singapore marked one of the lowest 
points for Churchill in the war; 
still it remains a puzzle why there 
is a long chapter on the fall of 
Singapore, with considerable detail 
about the sinking of Force Z, 
[Lamb's view that the Japanese 
"Zero" was far superior to the 
Brewster Buffalo available in the 
Malaya peninsula is of course quite 
right, except that the Japanese 
attacking aircraft had no fighter 
cover.] A chapter on India follows 
but nothing on the submarine war, 
then also at its height, and far 
more serious, in Churchill's view, 
than his problems in India. Nor 
can we find anything about the 
resources and the debates devoted 
to the strategic air offensive against 
Germany [except for the short 
reference, on p.151, quoted above.] 
There seems no explanation 
for the emphasis that Lamb puts 
on various aspects of the war. 
Churchill's policy in the Aegean, 
his desire to bring Turkey into the 
war and his "blunders" in 
Yugoslavia are described in two 
informative chapters but somewhat 
out of proportion with respect to 
the other elements in the war, 
particularly since the other 
resistance movements are hardly 
mentioned. Lamb is on somewhat 
firmer ground when he deals with 
the campaign after D-day, having 
already written a book on this 
subject. Still even here there some 
very curious ideas for someone who 
professes to admire Churchill. For 
instance the notion, which is also 
in his larger work, 9 that Churchill 
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feared that General Montgomery 
was stealing his limelight. [p.281] 
Lamb's conclusion goes over 
much the same ground as his 
chapters-Mers-el-Kebir remains 
- "possibly his gravest wartime 
blunder" [p.340]- "In his memoirs 
Churchill has falsified history not 
only over the pusillanimity of 
Halifax and Chamberlain in 1940, 
but over other important episodes 
... Why? He had nothing of which 
to be ashamed .... " [p.340] 
Churchill may have been a great 
wartime leader but that surely 
cannot be illustrated from a book 
which leaves out some of the most 
important and difficult campaigns 
of the war and makes a good many 
mistakes which are so elementary 
that a reasonable editor ought to 
have caught them ... with friends 
like this who needs enemies? 
Still there are enemies. 
Charmley's book clearly belongs in 
the fourth category. Once upon a 
time there was a great and peaceful 
Empire called the British Empire 
until a man called Winston 
Churchill came along and was 
nasty to a nice man called Hitler 
and nice to a nasty man called 
Roosevelt and so brought about the 
end of Glory! Actually, the theme 
of Charmley's Churchill, the End 
of Glory is only slightly more 
complicated than the above 
summary. It is a very large political 
biography (742 pp), which stops in 
1945, divided into fifty-five 
chapters, all of them with witty 
titles. The first section which takes 
Churchill from birth to 1915 deals 
briefly and sharply with the young 
Churchill and his overweening 
ambition and selfishness. It shows 
Charmley at his best, the writing 
has flair and the quotations, from a 
variety of sources, are trenchant 
and amusing. Churchill's first 
parting with the Conservative 
Party over the question of Free 
Trade is handled with vigour and 
even fairness. So, in some respects, 
are his policies as President of the 
Board of Trade and at the Home 
Office. However the strain is 
beginning to show although only in 
a minor way- on p.65 Charmley 
deals fairly with the question of 
the sending oftroops to Tonypandy 
but on p.67 he declares that "The 
myth of Churchill calling out the 
troops at Tonypandy was, like that 
of King Mred burning the cakes, 
symbolically true; it epitomized an 
attitude." And at the bottom of the 
same page, the "battle of Sydney 
Street" "seemed to epitomise 
Churchill's defects." So the rather 
amusing young man is beginning 
to turn into a rather more 
dangerous political animal. 
Charmley's opinion ofthe work 
of Churchill at the Admiralty before 
the outbreak of the First World 
War underlines this change. He 
signals this on p.74 " ... indeed 
without Churchill at the Admiralty, 
the policy of the Entente might 
well have broken down," and ends 
the discussion of the whole naval 
question by showing how far 
Britain was committed to France 
by 1914 and that this was the result 
of Churchill not understanding the 
political consequences of his naval 
policies. [p.82] That is not an 
indefensible position. Certainly 
British Naval policy in the pre-war 
period was of political consequence 
and Churchill, inconcentratingthe 
Fleet in the North Sea, gave the 
French the sense that their security 
outside the Mediterranean 
depended on British Naval 
dispositions. Still one would have 
more confidence in Charmley's 
naval judgements if he had not 
started World War One with "the 
sinking of several ships at Scapa 
Flow by German submarines" and 
demoting the German 
Battlecruiser Goeben to the status 
of a cruiser. [p. 99] As a cruiser she 
would no doubt have had little 
influence in creating the situation 
in which the Russians declared war 
on Turkey ... as a Battlecruiser, 
which bombarded Russian naval 
ports in the Black Sea, it really was 
quite another matter. 
The Dardanelles failure 
obviously made Churchill's position 
precarious. Still Charmley argues 
that it was because Churchill had 
alienated so many that he could 
not survive the failure [p.126], it 
was the fact that he was so 
"immensely self-absorbed ... "" ... 
such egoism is common in children 
but has usually rubbed away by 
the time adulthood is reached" 
[p.136] In other words the 
substance of the failure had less to 
do with his loss of office than his 
character. It is a point to which 
Charmley returns on numerous 
occasions in this long book. It is of 
course a view of history which 
spares historians the necessity of 
trying to trace the course of events 
and allows them to deal largely 
with extracts from diaries and 
memoirs, a technique that used to 
be called "scissors and paste," now 
made even simpler with the use of 
computers! 
The second section of the book 
covers the period from 1915 to 1939 
- "The Lost Leader." After his 
time in the trenches - Charmley 
never robs Churchill of his personal 
courage - there is the return to 
politics. Lloyd George wanted 
"someone who would cheer him up," 
so he brought back Churchill 
despite the opposition of virtually 
all his colleagues. [pp.144-5] With 
this begins his second career, the 
main event of which, according to 
Charmley, was the futile 
intervention in Russia, which 
brought down on him the ire of the 
Prime Minister. By February 1920 
another of Churchill's schemes lay 
in ruins and "once again, Churchill 
had demonstrated his greatest gift 
- that of isolating himself by 
alienating his supporters without 
winning over his old enemies." 
[p.157] 
The pattern for the book has 
now been set. There are passages 
where Charmley seems to consider 
seriously the policies and ideas of 
Churchill and the Governments in 
which he served, there are passages 
133 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 20
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/20
which are elegant and caustic ... 
"Churchill's defense of the treaty 
[the Irish Treaty] in the Commons 
the following day was one of his 
most effective speeches, thus 
proving the truth of his own 
comment that "the essence of 
statesmanship is platitude," there 
would be a final reconciliation 
between all the Irish and the 
English, " . . . Lacking both 
fanaticism and religion, Churchill 
was singularly ill-placed to 
understand those over-endowed 
with both." [pp.175-76] However 
the temptation to get in another 
sharp quotation prevents 
Charmley from developing any 
single theme coherently for more 
than a couple of pages, so the 
reader is often left with a jumble of 
confused and contradictory ideas. 
Churchill's espousal oflost causes 
in this section- Free Trade, Egypt, 
India, 10 Edward VIII- are difficult 
to reconcile with the ruthless, 
single-minded ambitious politician 
described so far. It may be that 
Charmley really has much 
sympathy with Churchill's attempt 
to stop the continuous erosion of 
British power and influence and is 
really rather angry at him for not 
succeeding. Still Charmley 
recognizes that "The considerations 
of economy, of public opinion and of 
the strategic weakness of the 
Empire which informed imperial 
policy also informed British foreign 
policy; in both cases Churchill 
ignored the limitations of power." 
[p.290] 
This informs much of the 
discussion ofChurchill's opposition 
to Chamberlain's policy after 193 7. 
That Churchill was often wrong, 
for example in his calculations 
about German air power, that he 
did not object to appeasing Italy, 
that his call for "Grand Alliance" 
with a suspicious Russia and a 
isolationist America was wishful 
thinking is really no longer 
seriously disputed. Nor can there 
be much dispute with the fact that 
Chamberlain seems to have 
understood the "limitations of 
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power" better than his critics. But 
that should not lead Charmley into 
the startling conclusion that "The 
real effect ofthe German occupation 
of Prague was on the position of 
Churchill," [p.359] although it does 
illustrate Charmley's almost 
unbelievable parochialism. 
Chamberlain may well have 
continued to believe that he could 
find a way to avoid war, but he now 
set about it in a manner that cannot 
be described as simply minor 
changes in tactics. Charmley 
spends some time dealing with the 
abortive negotiations with the 
Russians and mentions the 
guarantees to Poland but the 
critical decision to commit the 
British Army once again to the 
continent and the beginning of 
conscription seems to have entirely 
escaped his attention. 
Part III, "The Trumpets Silver 
Sound, 1939-1945" represents 
nearly a third of the book. But once 
the war begins Charmley, to borrow 
one of his chapter headings, is 
completely"at sea." His description 
of Churchill at the Admiralty leaves 
out almost everything that 
happened; one cannot tell whether 
Churchill, the second time around, 
was a successful First Lord or not, 
because while we are treated to a 
garbled account of "Operation 
Catherine," there is nothing here 
about the German submarines, or 
about Ocean raiders, about 
magnetic mines. Charmley seems 
to have read Lamb, [whom he 
accuses of" addictions to old myths" 
p.381, fn. 70] but not anything 
serious about the war at sea. He 
thinks that naval historians are a 
peculiar "sub-species" [see p.373 
fn.16 in which he even gets Lamb's 
view wrong]; still they might have 
helped him to understand what it 
was that Churchill and the Royal 
Navy were doing in the winter of 
1939-40. He might even have got 
the month of Operation "Menace" 
right [p.421], or stopped believing 
that "Ultra" was a German code 
[p.437] which had been broken by 
October 1940. 
The naval historians might 
also have helped him in his 
description of the Norwegian 
campaign. It was of course a 
disaster for which much blame can 
be attached to Churchill's handling 
of the Fleet. But nothing in 
Charmley's narrative clarifies a 
very confusing campaign nor does 
it add anything to our 
understanding of Churchill's part 
in it. Naturally judgements are 
not lacking, "At this stage of the 
war, and for years to come, 
Churchill grossly overestimated 
what could be achieved by sea-
power." [p.384] 11 This is a most 
peculiar judgement about a 
campaign in which the German 
Navy had just achieved precisely 
the sort of successful landing 
operations of which Churchill so 
often dreamt. 
The domestic consequences of 
this failure brings Charmley back 
to his home ground, back to 
snippets from diaries, 
parliamentary debates and 
Churchill's views ofhistory and his 
oratory. For the next three chapters 
we go through the summer of 1940, 
a summer of cabinet meetings and 
great speeches, for example 
Churchill's speech on June 4th" ... 
We shall go on to the end . . . " "It 
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was" concludes Charmley, "sublime 
- nonsense - but sublime 
nonsense." [p.411] Perhaps we can 
be persuaded to accept this 
judgement if we were told 
something about what actually 
happened in the summer of 1940 
outside Spears' and Sackville-
West's diaries, but this is a summer 
of 1940 with no Germans at all. No 
German aircraft over Britain, no 
Dowding, who is not mentioned in 
this account, no German invasion 
plans, no German submarines 
sinking ships and as we get to the 
fall and winter, no Blitz. It is 
indeed magic. Chapter 37, is 
entitled "The Struggle for 
Survival," but the survival that 
Charmley has in mind is Churchill's 
position as Prime Minister, not the 
relationship between German and 
British plans and actions. Almost 
everything about the war is reduced 
to single sentences, "The R.A.F. 
could maintain Britain's 
independence from Germany, but 
there was not much anyone could 
do to preserve it vis-a-vis America," 
[the only mention of the R.A.F. in 
this connection, p.431] ... but to 
follow this critique through would 
mean dealing with virtually every 
page of the book. As the war goes 
on, German, Italian and Japanese 
actions become more and more 
remote, noises off-stage. The 
Russo-German conflict gets one 
sentence mentions here and there, 
as do the U.S. campaigns in the 
Pacific. To write a biography of 
Churchill without the slightest 
understanding of the course of the 
war seems fool-hardy- but that is 
essentially what Charmley has 
done. The last chapters become 
muddled and weave together 
different themes often over-lapping 
and sometimes contradictory. It is 
all an attack on St. George, but 
there are no dragons, except 
Roosevelt and Stalin. Indeed while 
poor Mosley gets arrested just to 
support Churchill's attempt to find 
unity at home [p. 425], there is no 
mention ofN azi policies in occupied 
Europe, not even the massacre of 
the Jews. 
The strain of recent events shows clearly in Churchill's 
face at Moscow airport, 12 August 1942. 
Charmley sums up his view of 
what happened: 
Germany, Churchill had said, was 
a menace to the balance of power, 
and it was obvious that her 
ambitions were greater than 
Hitler admitted; she must be 
stopped. But in order to do so 
Churchill was forced to bankrupt 
Britain and mortgage its future to 
the United States - and, in the 
process, he had helped raise the 
spectre of a menace which was 
even greater than the one he had 
destroyed, if only because there 
was no balance of terror on the 
Continent. Hitler had had to keep 
an eye on the Soviet Union; who 
did Stalin have to keep an eye 
upon? This, then, was where the 
road to victory led. [pp.589-90] 
The "balance of power" 
becomes a "balance of terror" within 
the space of two sentences and the 
notion that Stalin did not have to 
keep his eye on a United States 
and Britain armed with an atomic 
bomb would no doubt come as a 
surprise to him. But it is typical of 
the kind of judgements that 
Charmley offers, for while it is true 
that the Soviet Union under Stalin 
expanded into Eastern Europe at 
the end ofthe war and that a reign 
of terror descended onto those areas 
as well as Eastern Germany, it is 
equally true that in contrast with 
Hitler during the war, when all of 
Europe lay under his power, Stalin 
had "only" a small part of it. It was 
not perhaps an ideal outcome of 
the war, but it was not the total 
catastrophe which Charmley 
claims. 
If Charmley set out to destroy 
myths, as he says so often, he has 
failed to do so, both because the 
myths he tackles are petty and 
because he has failed to understand 
the major problems of the war and 
with them Churchill's part in that 
war. Perhaps some knowledge of 
military history is, after all, a 
requirement for writing about the 
war. Moreover a totally insular 
view of the world which revolves 
exclusively around the diaries of 
English politicians and "literati" 
makes it difficult to understand a 
World War. IfCharmleyis a typical 
example ofthe new breed of British 
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historians it is truly the "end of 
Glory." 
Possibly a reassessment of 
Churchill has become necessary 
fifty years after the end of the 
Second World War, but none of the 
books reviewed, except the first, 
can be taken as a successful or 
even a serious attempt at such a 
task. Perhaps Taylor, a historian 
also fond of "making the facts fit 
his phrases," should have the last 
word: 
Late in life Churchill pronounced 
a gloomy verdict on his career. He 
remarked that the final verdict of 
history would take account not 
only of the victories achieved 
under his direction, but also of the 
political results which flowed from 
them and he added: "Judged by 
this standard, I am not sure that 
I shall be held to have done very 
well." Churchill did himself an 
injustice. The results were not 
his doing; the victories were. The 
results were foreshadowed when 
the British people resolved on war 
with Hitler. From that moment 
on it followed inexorably that, 
unless Hitler won, Soviet Russia 
would establish her domination of 
Eastern Europe and b.et;ome a 
world power. 12 
Even that domination has now come 
to an end. 
The British Empire has also 
gone, and despite Charmley, it was 
not really inherited by the United 
States; there are even those who 
argue that Canada still has some 
independence. Nor is it certain 
that the end of Empires was 
brought about by the war; the war 
ironically only reinforced the 
nationalism which was already 
such a powerful force in the early 
20th century. Churchill's place in 
all this is clearly important but he 
did not have the power to reverse 
this trend. Among the Hitlers, 
Stalins, Mussolinis and Francos 
he can hardly be accused of making 
the world an even worse place than 
it already was. Whatever his faults 
136 
he, together with those who 
supported him, and they were a 
large portion of the British and 
Dominion populations, managed, 
with considerable difficulty, to 
prevent Britain from suffering the 
fate that befell nearly all of the 
other European states at the hands 
of theN azi Regime. If that is myth, 
what is reality? 
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